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2Disability and Teacher Ethics:
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Abstract
The case of L v Minister for Education provides an excellent example of the complexity of the
ethical decisions teachers are sometimes required to make. But how can we gauge the
soundness of the teacher’s choices?  Using this legal case as its focus, the paper will first
examine issues of meta-ethics, drawing some conclusions about the ontological and
epistemological status of moral claims.  The paper will then address issues of normative ethics,
examining consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics as models for teacher conduct.
Finally, these models will be applied to the ethical problems raised in the case.  The central
intention of the paper is to raise some concerns over the decisions made in L v Minister for
Education, primarily regarding issues of social justice.
  
3Introduction: the case of L
In mid-1995, a girl of seven—“L”—was suspended from her school in Brisbane, Australia.
The girl, who was diagnosed with “global developmental delay”, attended the “Beta” primary
school full time, where she was given an individual education program, and funding for a
teachers aid for twenty hours per week.  L’s teachers soon stated that they had difficulty
managing her behaviour—which included the problems of frequent crying, lack of
concentration, a limited vocabulary and some hygiene problems—as well as managing the
education of the rest of the class.  Eventually, L was suspended from the school by the Deputy
Principal, a suspension supported by the Queensland Department of Education.
L’s mother took her daughter’s case to the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, arguing
that the Department of Education had discriminated against L under the terms of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), as the Act makes it illegal to treat an “impaired” child less
favourably than an ordinary child would be treated under similar circumstances.  The Tribunal
found that the Department of Education had indeed discriminated against L, but that this
discrimination was exempted because “unjustifiable hardship” would result.  As a result, L was
excluded from the mainstream state education system, and was told she could only attend a
“special” school.
L v Minister for Education became the subject of much discussion in Australia, not only among
those involved in the field of “special” education, but also among mainstream classroom
teachers, and even the media (Butler, 1995; Atkins, 1996).  The case reignited familiar debates
as to whether a mainstream education is the best choice for those children with disabilities, or
whether they are better off in specifically tailored surroundings.  There were concerns raised
about the costs to other children of the continued presence of the disabled in the classroom,
while others argued that all children benefit from such contact, learning vital life-skills of
flexibility, compassion, cooperation and respect for difference.  Also, the issue of exactly who
a teacher ought to be reasonably expected to teach caused a great deal of discussion and
concern, especially for education students, unsure of what was to be required of them in their
future working life.
And yet, debates that usually began over teacher expectations and student welfare, more often
than not, eventually took an ethical turn.  Questions that began as, “What can teachers be
expected to do?” and “Who should be in the mainstream classroom?” frequently became,
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teacher, vis-à-vis disability?”  Unfortunately, this question does not lend itself to an easy
answer.  Certainly, the answer does not lie solely within teacher education manuals, school
policy documents, or even within the pages of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act (1991).
It would also appear that L’s mother has a very different answer to this question than the
Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to address this issue in a slightly different way, one that
tries to avoid, or at least short-circuit, the binaries and circularities of the existing debates.  The
intention here is not to “solve” the ethical dilemmas associated with L v Minister for Education.
Rather, it is to use that case as way of ascertaining, in a broader sense, what kinds of ethical
systems are the most defensible, and from there, decide what can be concluded about the
actions of the various players involved.  The paper will largely focus on a single ethical
principle, both as an object of meta-analysis and point of practical application, a principle that
not only formed the foundation of L’s legal position, but also forms the logical basis for much
of the field of inclusive education.  The principle is: “It is wrong to discriminate against a
disabled child”.
“Ethics” has two central meanings.  First, the term refers to a set of principles, most often
derived from moral values, by which people organise their lives.  Second, the term also refers
to a body of theoretical study, now over 2500 years old, which attempts to make sense of all
those issues relating to, and resulting from, the first meaning of the term.  It would be
gratifying to think that this ancient body of knowledge could by now have come to a coherent
and unproblematic conclusion about how we should structure our relationships to such moral
terms as “ought”, “good”, and “right.”
The question then is, how can the body of ethical theory help us address the ethical principle:
“It is wrong to discriminate against a disabled child”?  This will be answered in three stages.
The first, a meta-ethical analysis addresses the nature of ethical reasoning, attempting to
delineate precisely what constitutes the substance of a “moral” point of view.  The second, a
normative ethical analysis, attempts to provide templates by which we can organise our moral
reasoning.  The third, a practical ethical analysis seeks to find appropriate ways of resolving
some of the moral dilemmas raised in the case of L v Minister for Education, in part by
applying the ideas constituted within the previous two elements.
5Meta-ethics
Whereas the vast majority of work within the philosophy of ethics has always been devoted to
finding the best way to live a “good” life, in recent years, the emphasis has shifted to a slightly
different project.  Rather than trying to determine which acts are good, which are bad, and in
what contexts, the focus has now fallen upon the nature of moral claims themselves.  After all,
the nature of a moral claim is far from self-evident.
  
Consider the following statements: “L is seven”, “L is a girl”, and “It is wrong to discriminate
against L”.  The meanings of all three are relatively clear, but can all these claims be tested,
and can they be determined to be either true or false?  It would be relatively easy to test the
validity of the first two statements: a simple reference to a birth certificate would probably
suffice, but if not, any number of other pieces of evidence—visual, medical, anecdotal—could
be used to prove their truth.  This is not the case for the final statement.  Wherein lies its truth?
How would you go about finding the “wrongness” of that action?  Just what is the truth status
of this claim?  These questions form the core of meta-ethics.
Realist Ethics vs Anti-realist Ethics
Probably the most fundamental disagreement in the field of meta-ethics takes place on an
ontological level between realism and anti-realism.  Realism proposes that moral facts exist
independently of what we think of them, that is, such facts are objectively true.  If indeed it is
the case that it is wrong to discriminate against a disabled child—and prima facie, most of us
would agree with this assertion—then this is true irrespective of the subjective feelings, desires
or opinions of specific moral agents.  This is because the truth or falsity of moral claims is
determined in relation to a mind-independent reality.
Obviously, anti-realism rejects this position, concluding instead that it makes no sense to talk
about the independent existence of moral facts.  Such facts are actually only ever determined in
relation to the subjectivity of specific evaluating subjects.  Therefore, a particular point of
reference is required before a moral judgement can be made.  After all, the discussion of
whether it is right or wrong to discriminate against the disabled might make sense within 21st
century western culture, but would be all but meaningless to Spartan parents from 4th century
BC, who killed all but the healthiest of their children (Lewis and Reinhold, 1955), an action we
6would regard as murder.  David Hume, one of the earliest advocates of ethical relativism, sums
up the problem for realism:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious; wilful murder, for instance.  Examine it in all
its lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call
vice.  In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives,
volitions and thoughts.  There is no matter of fact in the case.  You can never find it,
till you turn your reflexion into your own breasts, and find a sentiment of
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. (Hume, 1969: 468-69)
The relativist position therefore concludes that realism must be false as there is no viable
mechanism for acquiring moral knowledge if it is exists as an objective external facticity.
Realists rebut this argument by pointing out that in order to assert that the Spartans were in
error in killing their disabled children, it must be possible to appeal to something other than
individual and collective subjectivity.
Cognitivist Ethics vs. Non-cognitivist Ethics
This basic conundrum is also reflected at the epistemological level.  Ethical realism takes two
cognitive theoretical forms.  The first, naturalism, holds that ethical properties are themselves
natural properties, and as such are reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences.
Accordingly, the evaluative moral concept of “good” is basically no different from the
descriptive concept of “yellow”.  Both can be assessed objectively, empirical knowledge can
be gained about them, and as such, they can be either true or false.  The second, intuitionism,
was championed by G.E. Moore (1965), who although still a realist, argued instead that we are
unable to recognise the rightness or wrongness of an act simply by the ordinary use of our five
senses.  Instead, moral properties are deemed to be perceived through the use of a nebulous
sixth sense: our “intuition”.  Properties, like “goodness” for example, can only be defined in
moral terms. As Moore (1965:8) states “Goodness, like yellowness, is intuitively recognisable,
it cannot be explained to anyone who has not experienced it or has no knowledge of it.”  That
said, moral properties are still to be understood in cognitivist terms, and can they can still be
true or false.
The non-cognitivists reject this possibility.  They consider that since ethical sentences do not
assert genuine propositions, they can be neither true nor false.  Emotivism, a position normally
associated with A.J. Ayer (1971), contends that moral judgements are merely expressions of
feelings about the act being judged.  Olen (1983) makes the analogy of a football match,
7suggesting that when people boo and cheer the teams as they run onto a pitch, no-one is really
making a truth-claim about those teams in any real sense, nothing which can be either true or
false.  So it is with moral claims.  The statement, “It is wrong to discriminate against disabled
children”, is really just another way of saying, “Discrimination against disabled children ...
Boo! Hiss!”  Prescriptivism extends this position, claiming there is also a prescription of future
conduct, “Do not discriminate!” (Carnap, 1935).  Indeed, this “commending” element provides
another reason why such judgements cannot possibly be true or false (Hare, 1965).
Figure 1 positions these meta-ethical theories, both in relation to the nature and extent of
claims they make, as well as in relation to one another.
The question now is: how does all this affect our concerns over the ethical claim, “It is wrong
to discriminate against a disabled child”.  First, realist approaches to moral claims have the
advantage of appealing to some form of common sense.  Certainly, we all act as if such claims
have their origins within a broader and more profound realm than our own local interests and
motivations.  However, some philosophers have argued that taking different, more relativistic,
approach to ethics does not necessarily require the abandonment of the notion of objectivity
(Blackburn, 2000).  After all, it can be argued that it is possible to have ethical disagreements
without assuming that one side must be in error.  Second, there appear to be some significant
problems with cognitivist theories.  With naturalism, if moral facts cannot be observed, and
neither can they be proved by experiment, then ultimately there seems to be very limited
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8reasons for accepting that they exist at all.  Similarly, with intuitionism, how can it be certain
there is anything to intuit?  And what happens when intuitions conflict?
   
Non-cognitivism is also not free from critique.  In some ways, both emotivism and
prescriptivism are derivatives of ethical relativism, and as such are vulnerable to criticisms of
moral nihilism, in that they are deemed to operate within a conception of the world lacking any
moral nature (Smith, 2000).  This portrayal leaves them open to the assertion that they are
unable to state categorically, to cite a popular philosophical example, that torturing babies is
always and unequivocally wrong.  However, most relativists would still argue that even though
moral values may not be universal objective facticities, they are still grounded in rationality, a
rationality that surely precludes the possibility of constructing an ethical system that would
approve of the torturing of babies.
In summary, while no definitive conclusions have emerged from the field of meta-ethics, it
does appears that there are some solid arguments in favour of taking a more relativist approach
to understanding the status of moral claims.  This ultimately means that a statement such as “It
is wrong to discriminate against a disabled child” does not have the security of some
immutable, external moral template against which it can be measured and judged.  Rather, all
that can be said is that, within the boundaries of a particular culture or social group, an
acceptance of this assertion most likely corresponds to a prescription not to so discriminate.
   
Normative Ethics
Whereas meta-ethics is concerned with the very nature of ethics and moral decision-making,
normative ethics is much more concerned with the content of moral behaviour.  That is,
normative ethics seeks to provide codes of conduct, or action guides, through which any given
moral choice may be assessed and directed.  This is not to say that there is no correspondence
between meta-ethical presuppositions and the kind of normative model that might eventually
be adopted—there most likely is.  For example, with the three normative ethical positions to be
dealt with here (see figure 2), the virtue ethics of Aristotle has been positioned as a form of
relativism (Eassom, 2001), the utilitarian ethics of Benthem has been most closely tied to
naturalism (Popkin & Stroll, 1983), and with the deontological ethics of Kant, when he
famously talks about “…the moral law within me” (Kant, 1952), he so sounds rather like a
moral intuitionist.  However, this does not mean to say that a normative ethic cannot be studied,
9and ultimately applied, in its own right, without being too concerned about precisely what kind
of meta-ethical foundation it might be built upon.
   
 Figure 2.
Virtue ethics
The fundamental core of virtue ethics is its emphasis on moral character.  A virtue ethicist
would suggest that in order to gain some purchase on the notion of “goodness”, the first place
to look should be in the actions of a good person.  It is the character of this person which best
reflects and organises what we regard to be desirable, and this desirability is normally reflected
in a list of traits which are to be thought of as virtues—courage, temperance, wisdom, and
justice (often regarded as the “cardinal” moral virtues), but may also include generosity,
benevolence, constancy and industry, although these are by no means fixed or agreed upon
(Tannsjo, 2002). The logic of virtue ethics is summed up well by Hursthouse (1997:218) who
states that “An action is right iff (if and only if) it is what a virtuous agent would do in the
circumstances.”  To put it another way: if you have a moral dilemma, the correct course of
action lies in what you know a virtuous person would do.
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This understanding of normative ethics—originating principally from Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics (1980)—differs from its rivals in a number of significant ways.  A virtue ethicists would
consider the question, “What is the best way to live?” as being of much less importance than
the question, “What kind of person should I be?”  This is because the kind of person you are,
(eg. a virtuous person), determines how your actions are to be interpreted (ie. good).  This
reverses the logic of the other approaches that assess the nature of the person based upon a
prior assessment of the specific action (eg. stealing is wrong … you stole … ergo, you are bad).
The question now is: where does virtue ethics stand in relation to the ethical principle, “It is
wrong to discriminate against a disabled child.”  Virtue ethics would be more interested in who
may or may not have discriminated against a child, and the circumstances of this
discrimination.  If it was a virtuous person, then this was, by definition, a virtuous act.  An
alternative approach might be to ask: What would a virtuous person do?  Would a virtuous
person discriminate against a disabled child?  The answer is probably not.
It should be mentioned here that virtue ethics is generally regarded as having a number of
fairly significant problems.  For example, there remain questions as to which virtues are to be
considered important (MacIntyre, 1988), and whether a virtuous person can do a bad act, and
there also appears some circularity in the reasoning.  Consequently, up until fairly recently,
virtue ethics did not appear to have survived the onslaught of the more contemporary
consequentialist and deontological normative frameworks, and it was only with the publication
of Anscombe’s (1958) Modern Moral Philosophy that virtue ethics once again re-emerged as a
viable position.
Consequentialist ethics
The term consequentialism was first used by Anscombe’s (1958) Modern Moral Philosophy,
the same text that re-ignited interest in virtue ethics.  Consequentialism holds that moral
evaluation between different courses of action should be made on the basis of a comparision of
the consequences of those actions: that is, the action that brings about the best outcome is the
right thing to do.  The most important consequentialist position, and the focus of this section of
the paper, is utilitarianism.  Although the ideas from which later versions of utilitarianism
developed can first be seen in the writings of the British empiricist, David Hume, they were
made fully explicit in the first half of the nineteenth century  by Jeremy Benthem (1988), and
in a more qualified way, by John Stuart Mill (1957).  Utilitarianism has bee defined as, “the
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theory that you ought always to act so as to maximise social utility, where ‘social utility’ is
simply another name for the general welfare.”  (Harman, 1977:152)
For example, supposing a moral agent is confronted with a choice between two possible
options: A) discriminating against a particular disabled child, and B) not discriminating against
a particular disabled child.  Utilitarians would argue that the correct decision is one which,
when considering all relevant factors, is conducive to a larger balance of good over bad,
pleasure over pain.  In this manner, it is suggested that the agent is freed from all ethical
decision-making, other than the ability to sum the relevant components of the equation and
thereby reach a conclusion.  Therefore, if it were the case that after calculating the good/bad
consequences of options A and B, choice A resulted in slightly greater good, then the strict
utilitarian would therefore choose A, irrespective of the fact that A involved, for example,
breaking a promise, lying, or acting unjustly.
This strict form of act-utilitarianism—championed by J.J.C. Smart (1973)—is often considered
to be a less sophisticated version of the theory than its counterpart: “rule-utilitarianism.”  This
latter approach proposes that choices are more often made on the basis of rules rather than by
addressing individual consequences of specific actions.  In this manner, the principle of utility
is maintained, but not at the level of particular judgements.  Therefore, if choice
A—discriminating against the child—involves breaking a promise (for example, to act
equitably), even when keeping the promise does not lead to the best consequences, then a rule-
utilitarian may elect choice B instead.
Utilitarianism has also been heavily criticised.  Bernard Williams (1972; 1973), one of the
theories most prominent critics, has identified a number of significant flaws within its logic.
First, he argues that its fundamental axis, happiness, is problematic.  He suggests that the
“Greatest Happiness Principle” (the core of utilitarian thinking) is only viable if happiness is in
some way a generalisable, cumulative concept, irrespective of the fact that a happy life may
include a variety of moral values, such as freedom, artistic self-expression, or spontaneity, all
of which have little or nothing in common.
Second, there is the issue of negative responsibility: Williams uses the example of having to
execute one innocent person to save twenty, which would be regarded as unproblematic act
within utilitarian thinking.  Williams concludes from this example that giving such ready
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approval to the doing of a bad deed, in order to prevent a worse one, is symptomatic of
utilitarians’ inability to either address or understand issues such as social justice, individual
fairness or personal integrity.  This position is summarised by Lyons (1965), who argues that
since no single theory can possibly account for all cases and circumstances, considerations of
fairness and justice ought to outweigh considerations of utility.
Finally, Williams’ last criticism is perhaps the most obvious and the most important.  It has
already been explained that utilitarians consider that good can be defined in terms of the
welfare of the greatest number, determined by the production of the greatest amount of social
happiness.  Since no other moral consideration is of relevance, and since the concept of
happiness is reduced to a reflection-free index of social pleasure, this leaves room for some
very perturbing forms of social action.  As Williams states in Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy (1985: 86): “If racist prejudice is directed towards a small minority by a majority
that gets enough satisfaction from it, it could begin to be touch and go whether racism might
not be justified.”  The same could also be said for other forms of prejudice, such as against
disabled children in schools.  After all, if the majority of the students feel they gain from the
discrimination—academically, pedagogically, socially—then any injustice done to the disabled
child is irrelevant.
Deontological ethics
Deontological ethics, otherwise called duty ethics, provides a coherent alternative to the
utilitarian position.  Supporters of this position, which would now include the majority of
moral philosophers (Olen, 1983), argue that the consequences of an action should not enter into
any judgment of whether that action is to be deemed right or wrong.  Rightness or wrongness is
inherent within the very nature of the act, and it should not matter what happens afterwards.
Deontological ethics are almost always represented by the ideas of Immanuel Kant.  Kant’s
moral theories are complex and far-reaching, but three significant components can be dealt
with here.  The first addresses the centrality of the notion of duty, in that Kant believed that the
pivotal element of morality is motive, and that acting in a particular manner simply because of
a concern for the consequences is not to act morally.  An act is only moral when an agent
realised that they have a duty to act in a particular way, and therefore does so, even to their
own detriment.  Therefore, why an act is done is the crucial feature of Kant’s moral system,
and what happens afterwards—the utilitarian position—is completely irrelevant.
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The second element of Kant’s moral theory is his most well-known, and involves his
categorical imperative.  In the same way that Descartes sought to build an epistemological
framework on the foundation of “Cogito Ergo Sum”, so did Kant try to identify a moral
absolute upon against which all manner of actions could be measured and assessed.  In
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1998:31) stated: There is, therefore, only a
single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.  According to the
categorical imperative then, it is immoral for someone to lie, because by lying themselves, they
are asserting that it is perfectly acceptable for everyone to lie.  As this is obviously
unacceptable, therefore we must always tell the truth.
The final notable component of Kant’s moral theory is sometimes referred to as the practical
imperative.  The operative principle here is that nobody should ever be thought of simply as a
means to an end, rather they should always be regarded as ends in themselves.  As an almost
direct rebuttal of utilitarianism, this imperative precludes the possibility overriding the rights of
the one in the name of the many.  The point here appears to be that fundamental issues of
equity and fairness cannot be traded away for some other “greater” good.
So how do deontologists approach the ethical principle: “It is wrong to discriminate against a
disabled child”?  The answer here is therefore likely to be very different to that provided by
utilitarians, as there would be no consideration of the possible outcomes of the decision.
Instead, the focus would fall on precisely why moral agents made their choices, since the
motives behind any possible discrimination are crucial to any assessment of the action—ie.
was the choice based upon professional responsibility? or perhaps fear of difference?  Also, the
implication of one moral agent deciding to discriminate against a disabled child is that
everyone should be able to do the same.  Furthermore, it is fairly likely that the disabled child
is facing discrimination in order to better the lot of others, and is hence being used as a means,
rather than being regarded as an end in itself.  Therefore, on the basis of the above, it would
seem that the more a deontologist looks into this issue, the more likely they are to conclude
that discriminating against a disabled child is, a priori, wrong
Deontological ethics is also not without its critics.  Two main concerns have been raised which
can be dealt with here, both concerning Kant’s moral absolutism.  First, if moral agents are to
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make choices on the basis of their duties, what happens when these duties are in conflict?  If C
promises D to keep a secret, but then C is asked to tell the truth about some matter contained in
that secret, are there not conflicting moral duties for C, one in terms of keeping a promise to D,
and one in terms of not lying?  It would appear so, and Kant did not offer a solution to this
conundrum.
Second, and very much associated with the first, Kant did not believe in making exceptions to
his moral rules.  After all, such rules would be fairly pointless if every time the circumstances
proved difficult, it was possible to simply make an exception to that rule.  Consequently, Kant
would not accept that it was ever morally acceptable to lie, even if it meant preventing a much
greater wrong.  Once again, this is an almost direct rejection of utilitarianism, and once again,
this sole emphasis on the rightness or wrongness of the act itself has very significant
implications for the primary focus of this paper—the case of L v Minister for Education.
Conclusion – Applied Ethics
Aristotle believed that there was little purpose in studying ethics unless this knowledge would
then have some positive effects on people’s lives.  This seems sensible.  Consequently, the
question now is, what do the meta-ethical and normative ethics positions established here
enable us to think about the decisions made by L’s teachers to exclude her from their
classroom?  Admittedly, the teachers were not the only players in this drama.  They were
supported in their actions by the school and the Queensland Department of Education.
However, their initial refusal to continue teaching L makes them the logical primary point of
analysis.  The intention here is neither to applaud nor castigate the teachers involved for their
choices.  Indeed, the specific circumstances of the case, circumstances which undoubtedly
impacted upon their decisions, are almost irrelevant here.  The teachers are simply being
employed here as exemplars within a broader debate that has occurred among those involved in
the field, or among those have been affected by the decision, over the past ten years.
Employing virtue ethics in this situation produces some ambiguous results.  If the teachers are
good people, and there is no reason to believe from the transcripts of the Queensland Anti-
discrimination Tribunal that they are not, then having L removed from the classroom was the
right thing to do.  It is possible that the decision reflected the presence of some of the
“cardinal” virtues of courage (in the face of a difficult decision), wisdom (for realising the
decision needed to be made) and justice (in their concerns for the welfare of the other children).
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However, it could equally well reflect the absence of some of these, and other, virtues.  It may
well have been the lack of courage and sense of justice, as well as a lack of benevolence and
industry, that resulted in L having to leave the classroom.  Only the teachers involved can
know, which admirably demonstrates one of the great weaknesses in virtue ethics: are these
good acts by good people, or bad acts by bad people?   Perhaps neither.
It is fairly clear that the central rationale behind the decisions in L v Minister for Education is
based upon utilitarian reasoning.  As one of the teachers said at the tribunal, he could give L a
good lesson, or he could give the remainder of the class a good lesson, but he could not do both
(Butler, 1995).  Under these circumstances, a utilitarian calculation was clearly made, and the
maximum social good was deemed to lie with L’s removal—although against her wishes and
those of her mother.  The social context of this neat piece of mathematics also demonstrates
some of the well-documented flaws within utilitarianism.  First, this appears to be an ethical
paradigm that has little regard for issues of social justice and minority rights, and so if the
majority of the class consider that they will benefit from L’s removal, then L’s right or desire
to stay is irrelevant.  Second, the mathematical calculations involved in utilitarianism are
necessarily insufficient.  When does the calculating stop?  After all, what might at first appear
as a short-term gain, may well turn into a loss in the long-term.  The temporary benefits of
greater class discipline and order may need to be balanced against the acquisition of
problematic life-long beliefs that most difficulties can be solved by exclusion, that basic
compassion is unnecessary, and that those with differences do not belong with the rest of us.  It
is perhaps not surprising that utilitarianism has struggled in the face of these criticisms.
It seems fairly unequivocal that deontological ethics would regard the decision to discriminate
against L to be a wrong act, the conclusion also reached by the Tribunal.  The fact that the
Tribunal also found that the consequences of L’s inclusion in the classroom meant that the
teachers were justified to do so, is irrelevant within Kant’s ethical universe.  Not only is L
being treated as a means to an end, ie. the “better” welfare of others, but also there are to be no
exceptions to the categorical imperative, ie. should we have as a general rule that it is
acceptable to discriminate against a disabled child?  If the answer is no, then the discrimination
against L was wrong.  This appears to be a somewhat harsh and inflexible model of ethical
analysis.
16
It is at this point that some compromise might be called for.  While not exempt from criticism
itself, William Ross’s (1930) theoretical adaptation of Kant, based around the notion of Prima
Facie Duties, offers one possible route out of this impasse.  This theory remains within a
deontological framework, in that it still seeks to locate the operative element of any moral
decision within the type of action in question, rather than within its consequences.  However,
while this approach prioritises our primary duties and obligations—telling the truth, keeping
promises, not discriminating against disabled children—it also seeks to find a way to give the
system some room for manoeuvre, if sufficiently serious circumstances arise.  After all, does
anyone, with the possible exception of Kant himself, think it wrong to tell a lie in order to save
the life of an innocent person?  Ross points to seven “Prima Facie” duties.  These are duties
that must be adhered to before any other issues are taken into consideration.  They are duties of
fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence.
These obligations are deemed to have priority over all other issues when making ethical
choices, unless there are very serious reasons why not.  For all intents and purposes then, prima
facie duties are the same as moral principles, provided that all other conditions are regarded as
being equal.
Using the example of L, it would be possible to state that the prima facie duties of justice,
beneficence and non-maleficence probably apply to the teachers under these circumstances, in
that they had a duty to prevent the improper distribution of good and bad, to help improve the
conditions of others, and to prevent injury to others (in this case, perhaps emotional injury).
However, rather than this unquestionably demonstrating that they had acted wrongly, the
teachers would have to demonstrate that other serious reasons had caused them to resile from
these duties.  Whether their arguments are accepted would then a matter of interpretation of the
facts.
It is not only deontologists who have sought to find some common ground.  It has also been
argued from the utilitarian end of the scale that some form of compromise may be necessary.
Richard Brandt, in the paper “Towards a credible form of utilitarianism” (1978) argues that
utilitarian conclusions need not be binding upon an individual, rather they may be used as a
guide for action.  That said, Ross would only consider this to be acceptable if utilitarian
concerns were to be lightly overlayed on a solid deontological foundation, rather than the other
way around.
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In summary then, the central purpose of this paper has been to examine the ethical choices
made in L v Minister for Education through the lens of moral theory.  The primary conclusion
to be drawn is that simplistic utilitarian analysis, seemingly the most common way of deciding
macro-issues of governance, does not hold up to any kind of philosophical scrutiny, and since
this seems to have been the driving rationale behind the decision to exclude L from the
mainstream classroom, there are reasons to find this decision problematic.  That is, what has
often been called the “cost-benefit’ approach to ethical decision-making, has a number of
shortcomings, not least of which is its limited ability to deal with issues of social justice and
minority rights, including those of the disabled.
It would appear then that a more fruitful method of deciding right from wrong is to be found
within deontological frameworks, even if, to avoid the excesses of Kantian absolutism, some
utilitarian qualifiers may be required.  However, these qualifiers are not to be regarded as all-
purpose escape clauses that permit the avoiding of significant moral responsibilities simply
because the going gets a little difficult.  After all, the question will always be where to draw the
line on the sand, and a good place to start is with Kant’s practical imperative that individuals
must always be treated as ends in themselves, an approach which forms not only the core of
deontological ethics, but also the logical foundation of the entire doctrine of inclusive
education.  This does not appear to have been the case with the Tribunal decision, which seems
to have made a straight-forward utilitarian calculation—a calculation which has significant
implications for issues of social justice:
…it seems to me that other considerations, such as the stresses placed on teaching
staff at Beta [the school] without specialist training and the disruption entailed to
other children, are such as to outweigh to benefits to L and constitute unjustifiable
hardship to the Department should it be compelled to accept L back into the Beta
school. (L v Minister for Education, 1996: 9)
As previously mentioned, if stresses are placed on teaching staff without specialist training, or
disruption caused to other children, all because of the presence of someone with a different
colour skin, or a different religion, this logic may well support their removal too.
It should be restated that this paper is not intended as a blanket criticism of teachers who feel
they have to make the kinds of decisions made here.  As stated earlier, teachers are forced to
make complex ethical choices, often under very difficult circumstances.  These circumstances
include poor funding, limited resources, negligible support and insufficient inservicing, all
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within a pedagogic context which increasingly values academic excellence over pastoral care.
If utilitarianism fails as an ethical model, in part, because of its inability to deal with issues of
social justice, as has been suggested here, then ethical problems faced by contemporary
teachers are also, in many ways, a function of the difficulties associated with construction a
just education system within a just society.   In which case, probably the next paper that needs
to be written on the subject of L v Minister for Education, and one which extends the ethical
concerns raised here, ought to ask the question: “What exactly do we mean when we talk about
a just society.”
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